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Financing universal health coverage—eﬀ ects of alternative 
tax structures on public health systems: cross-national 
modelling in 89 low-income and middle-income countries
Aaron Reeves, Yannis Gourtsoyannis, Sanjay Basu, David McCoy, Martin McKee, David Stuckler
Summary
Background How to ﬁ nance progress towards universal health coverage in low-income and middle-income countries 
is a subject of intense debate. We investigated how alternative tax systems aﬀ ect the breadth, depth, and height of 
health system coverage.
Methods We used cross-national longitudinal ﬁ xed eﬀ ects models to assess the relationships between total and 
diﬀ erent types of tax revenue, health system coverage, and associated child and maternal health outcomes in 
89 low-income and middle-income countries from 1995–2011.
Findings Tax revenue was a major statistical determinant of progress towards universal health coverage. Each 
US$100 per capita per year of additional tax revenues corresponded to a yearly increase in government health 
spending of $9·86 (95% CI 3·92–15·8), adjusted for GDP per capita. This association was strong for taxes on capital 
gains, proﬁ ts, and income ($16·7, 9·16 to 24·3), but not for consumption taxes on goods and services 
(–$4·37, –12·9 to 4·11). In countries with low tax revenues (<$1000 per capita per year), an additional $100 tax revenue 
per year substantially increased the proportion of births with a skilled attendant present by 6·74 percentage points 
(95% CI 0·87–12·6) and the extent of ﬁ nancial coverage by 11·4 percentage points (5·51–17·2). Consumption taxes, 
a more regressive form of taxation that might reduce the ability of the poor to aﬀ ord essential goods, were associated 
with increased rates of post-neonatal mortality, infant mortality, and under-5 mortality rates. We did not detect these 
adverse associations with taxes on capital gains, proﬁ ts, and income, which tend to be more progressive.
Interpretation Increasing domestic tax revenues is integral to achieving universal health coverage, particularly in 
countries with low tax bases. Pro-poor taxes on proﬁ ts and capital gains seem to support expanding health coverage 
without the adverse associations with health outcomes observed for higher consumption taxes. Progressive tax 
policies within a pro-poor framework might accelerate progress toward achieving major international health goals.
Funding Commission of the European Communities (FP7–DEMETRIQ), the European Union’s HRES grants, and 
the Wellcome Trust.
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Introduction
Universal health coverage (UHC) seems likely to feature 
in the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals.1,2 In 
2005, all 192 member states of the WHO committed 
themselves to achieving UHC, whereby “all people obtain 
the health services they need without suﬀ ering ﬁ nancial 
hardship when paying for them.”3 In 2012, Margaret Chan 
told the World Health Assembly that “Universal health 
coverage is the single most powerful concept that public 
health has to oﬀ er.”4 Subsequently, the UN General 
Assembly’s resolution on UHC passed unanimously.5
Despite increasing recognition that UHC is an urgent 
social goal, only 20 low-income and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) currently have veriﬁ able UHC.6 How 
best to achieve UHC remains unclear, especially in 
LMICs where opportunities for domestic ﬁ nancing 
might be constrained. The 2010 World Health Report set 
out a “Path to Universal Health Coverage”,1,2 containing 
four ﬁ nancing strategies, such as increasing eﬃ  ciency of 
taxation, reprioritising government budgets toward 
health, evaluating innovative ﬁ nancial mech anisms (eg, 
ﬁ nancial transaction taxes), and increasing development 
assistance for health. The 2013 World Health Report says 
that “the general solution for achieving wide coverage of 
ﬁ nancial risk protection [ from ﬁ nancial ruin or 
impoverishment due to health-care costs] is through 
various forms of prepayment for services”.2 Recently, 
The Lancet’s Commission on Investing in Health 
called for a “grand convergence”7 in health with 
implementation of UHC. It recommended raising 
revenues through taxation (principally on tobacco and 
other unhealthy products) but failed to specify how 
suﬃ  cient revenue could be raised, particularly in highly 
deprived settings where a large fraction of health 
spending comes from donor assistance.7
Tax revenues are the main source of government funds 
available for ﬁ nancing and expanding health systems in 
most nations.8 In LMICs, tax revenues account for roughly 
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65% of total government revenues.9 However, few studies 
have rigorously evaluated how diﬀ erent tax regimes aﬀ ect 
health systems.10 Although tax revenues can come from 
multiple sources, including corporate earnings, capital 
gains, proﬁ ts, income, and consumption, most revenue 
growth in LMICs since 1990 has been from consumption 
taxes. Large informal economies create situations in 
which taxing goods and services might be a more feasible 
and stable source of government revenue than taxing 
income or wealth directly. Additionally, some economists, 
concerned that high taxes on proﬁ ts or capital gains might 
deter foreign (or private) investment, have promoted 
indirect taxation, such as on consumption.11 Panel 1 
describes three categories of tax on which the World Bank 
collects data, derived from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)’s Government Finances Statistics Manual.12,13 
Although the eﬀ ect of diﬀ erent tax systems can vary 
substantially, in general, consumption taxes (taxes on 
goods and services) tend to be more regressive, placing a 
greater burden on low-income groups (panel 2 deﬁ nes 
these terms).14,15 Consumption taxes on staple food 
products and health-care services increase their overall 
price, so reducing utilisation just like user charges or 
copayments. For example, tax simulation models from 
South Africa ﬁ nd that although increased taxes on either 
general income, consumption, or both, could expand 
health coverage, consumption taxes would reduce access 
to nutrition and health-care for poorer households.16 
However, the focus of much research and policy interest 
in health-care ﬁ nancing in LMICs has been on the scale of 
external aid and displacement of domestic spending, 
rather than on how domestic public ﬁ nance is generated 
and how it can be increased.17,18
In this paper, for the ﬁ rst time to our knowledge, we test 
associations between alternative types of tax revenue and 
indicators designed to capture dimensions of the breadth, 
depth, and height of UHC.1,19 These measures correspond, 
in turn, to the proportion of the population with access to 
health care, the scope of services covered, and their quality. 
We postulate that pro-poor or redistributive tax policies 
are likely to accelerate progress towards UHC.20
Methods
Data collection
We obtained data for tax revenues, health spending, gross 
domestic product (GDP), and development assistance for 
health from the World Bank’s 2013 World Development 
Indicators,13 from 1995 to 2011. Tax revenues are deﬁ ned as 
“the sum of all ﬂ ows that are classiﬁ ed as taxes”, which 
speciﬁ cally excludes “ﬁ nes, penalties, and most social 
security contributions” such as compulsory social health 
insurance contributions. Health expenditure was 
disaggregated into government and private sources. Public 
health expenditure consists of social (or compulsory) 
health insurance funds including donations from 
international agencies. Private health expenditure includes 
direct household spending (out-of-pocket expenditure, 
OOP), private voluntary insurance, and other non-state 
forms of funding (eg, charities). All economic data were 
adjusted for inﬂ ation and purchasing power.
Measuring dimensions of UHC
With no comparable single indicators of UHC, we draw 
on a series of measures that capture the breadth, depth, 
and height of coverage.6 We measured breadth using 
the International Labour Organization’s indicator of 
ﬁ nancial coverage21 (the proportion of the population 
who would incur severe ﬁ nancial costs in accessing 
health care) for the latest available year. We measured 
access to care (depth of coverage) using the few 
cross-national data sources on health-care coverage, 
including the proportion of pregnant women receiving at 
Panel 1: Forms of tax revenue reported by the World Bank
Our analysis focuses on three main forms of tax as 
categorised and reported by the World Bank:
Taxes on income, proﬁ ts, and capital gains
Taxes on income, proﬁ ts, and capital gains are levied on the 
actual or presumptive net income of individuals, on the 
proﬁ ts of corporations and enterprises, and on capital gains, 
whether realised or not, on land, securities, and other assets
Taxes on goods and services
Taxes on goods and services include general sales and 
turnover or value added taxes, selective excises on goods, 
selective taxes on services, taxes on the use of goods or 
property, taxes on extraction and production of minerals, and 
proﬁ ts of ﬁ scal monopolies
Other taxes
Other taxes include employer payroll or labour taxes 
(non-income), taxes on property, and taxes not allocable to 
other categories, such as penalties for late payment or 
non-payment of taxes
Panel 2: Key tax-related deﬁ nitions
Domestic tax revenue
The sum of the charges or other levies imposed on taxpayers 
(both individuals and legal entities) by a state.
Progressive taxation
A progressive tax is one that takes a higher share of the 
income of the rich. An example is an income tax levied at 20% 
on the ﬁ rst £25 000, at 40% on all income between 
£25 000 and £50 000, and 60% at everything over £50 000.
Regressive taxation
A regressive tax is one that takes a higher share of the income 
of the poor. An example is a sales tax levied at 20% on basic 
amenities. Poor people typically pay a much higher share of 
their income on such amenities than rich people, so the total 
tax they pay will also be a much larger share of their income.
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least four antenatal visits and the proportion of births 
attended by a skilled health-care professional, again from 
the latest available year.22 Following previous studies23,24 
we assessed quality using outcomes data potentially 
amenable to health-care intervention including infant, 
neonatal, under-5 mortality per 1000 livebirths, and 
maternal mortality per 100 000 livebirths, taken from the 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), 
covering the years 1995–2011.23,24
We compared three categories of taxation using World 
Bank taxation classiﬁ cation schema (panel 1): revenues 
from income, proﬁ ts, and capital gains; revenues from 
taxes on the consumption of goods and services; and 
other forms of tax revenue, which include non-income 
labour taxes and ﬁ nes. Although not all types of taxation 
are unequivocally progressive or regressive,25 the ﬁ rst 
tends to be more progressive, the second tends to be 
more regressive, and the third is ambiguous. Albeit an 
imperfect classiﬁ cation, reviews indicate that “sales 
[consumption] taxes are regressive wherever they are 
found”19,26 and suggest that “the proportion of tax 
revenue raised through sales taxes can serve as an index 
of overall progressivity in situations where the detailed 
data…are not available”, as in many LMICs.26–28 The 
appendix shows descriptive statistics for all variables.
Statistical models
To evaluate the association between tax revenue and 
health systems, we estimated a series of cross-national, 
multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) models, 
correcting for country-speciﬁ c diﬀ erences (ie, country-
speciﬁ c slopes), as follows:
Here, i is country and t is year. UHC is a vector 
of seven indicators of progress towards UHC. 
Four indicators are available on a longitudinal basis ([1] 
government health expenditure; [2] private health 
expenditure; [3] child mortality per 1000 livebirths 
including neonatal, post-neonatal, age 1–5 years, and 
under-5 mortality; and [4] maternal mortality per 
100 000 livebirths). A further three were only available as a 
cross-section ([5] proportion of births with a skilled 
attendant; [6] proportion of women receiving at least 
four antenatal visits; and [7] proportion of the population 
who incur severe ﬁ nancial costs in accessing health care). 
We performed separate models for each of these seven 
dependent variables. Tax is the measure of tax revenue, 
similarly adjusted. Models included controls for GDP per 
capita, adjusted for inﬂ ation and purchasing-power parity. 
All models for which longitudinal data are available 
correct for linear country-speciﬁ c time trends and 
country-speciﬁ c ﬁ xed eﬀ ects (μ); ε is the error term. 
Robust standard errors were clustered by country. In 
subsequent models we disaggregate total tax revenue into 
the three main World Bank categories mentioned above 
and include per capita development assistance for health 
to correct for the inﬂ uence of aid programmes. All models 
were estimated using STATA version 12.
Role of funding source
The funders of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. The corresponding author had full access to all 
the data in the study and had ﬁ nal responsibility for the 
decision to submit for publication.
Results
We noted a strong unadjusted association between tax 
revenues and government spending on health in 2009 
(r=0·91, p<0·0001; ﬁ gure 1). Table 1 shows results from 
the cross-national, ﬁ xed eﬀ ects longitudinal models of 
the association of tax, GDP, and health spending for 
the years 1995 through 2011, adjusted for potential 
confounding factors. In LMICs, each $100 per-capita 
increase in tax revenue was associated with an 
additional public health spending per capita of $9·86. 
Each $100 increase in GDP per capita was associated 
with an increase of $1·86. Although not reported in 
table 1, adjusting for tax revenues substantially 
attenuated the GDP coeﬃ  cient for public spending, 
consistent with taxation occupying a position on the 
pathway linking them (unadjusted βGDP=$3·98, 95% CI 
2·38–5·58).
We repeated these analyses for private health spending 
(table 1). Economic growth signiﬁ cantly associated with 
greater private health spending in LMICs; tax revenues, 
however, had no eﬀ ect on private health spending after 
adjusting for economic growth rates.
In table 2 we evaluated how these associations diﬀ ered 
by type of taxation. Using longitudinal ﬁ xed-eﬀ ects 
See Online for appendix
UHCit = a + β 1 Taxit + B2GDPit + μi + εit
 Figure 1: Tax revenues and health spending in low-income and middle-income countries, 2009
Source: World Bank Indicators. Excludes Botswana, Hungary, Seychelles, and St Vincent and Grenadines. Some 
countries are not labelled for sake of clarity. Tax revenue and public health spending is adjusted for inﬂ ation and 
purchasing power. PPP=purchasing power parity.
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models, we noted that each $100 rise in taxation is 
correlated with an $16·70 increase in government health 
expenditure from income, proﬁ ts, and capital gains, 
whereas neither consumption taxes (–$4·37) nor other 
forms of taxation (–$3·40) were strongly associated with 
health spending. This pattern reﬂ ected the political 
economy of taxation; using data from the World Bank’s 
Political Institutions database, we found that, after 
adjusting for GDP, governments ruled by left-leaning 
parties (categorised on the basis of the economic ideology 
of manifestos) raised, on average, $100·90 (95% CI 
39·1 to 162·8) per capita greater tax revenues than those 
ruled by right-leaning parties (p=0·001), with a higher 
share of progressive sources, from income, proﬁ ts, and 
capital gains (23·2% of tax revenues in left-leaning 
countries vs 19·5% of tax revenues in right-leaning 
countries). This was one reason why left-leaning parties 
tended to invest, on average, $23·2 (7·08 to 39·37) per 
person more in health than did right-leaning governments.
For the study of taxation and progress towards UHC, 
we ﬁ rst present unadjusted cross-sectional associations 
of tax revenues per capita with public health spending 
per capita, the proportion of populations with antenatal 
coverage, attended births, and post-neonatal mortality in 
the appendix. These show a clear convergence as tax 
revenues increase to the maximum 100% coverage. Since 
countries with high coverage and tax resources would be 
unlikely to gain additional beneﬁ t, unadjusted ordinary 
least squares would tend to underestimate the association 
between tax revenues and UHC. Thus we next evaluated 
the association of changes in tax revenues in low-revenue 
nations (ie, tax revenue <$1000 per capita per year) using 
cross-sectional models (ﬁ gure 2). The appendix shows 
that each $100 increase in tax revenue was associated 
with a 6·74 percentage point (95% CI 0·87–12·6) increase 
in the proportion of women whose births were attended 
by a skilled worker and an 11·4 percentage point 
(5·51–17·2) increase in the proportion of the population 
with access to health insurance. After adjusting for GDP, 
we noted no association between tax revenues and 
maternal mortality (appendix)
The aforementioned statistical models show that tax 
revenues are strongly associated with greater investment 
in public health, access to services and better outcomes. 
However, some forms of taxation might have unintended 
consequences, adversely aﬀ ecting low-income groups, 
especially when levied on goods and services, such as 
food and health care, necessary for survival. Thus, 
consumption taxes on health care are simply user 
charges that will reduce access and utilisation.29 Thus, to 
identify potential adverse consequences, we test the 
eﬀ ectiveness of alternative tax regimes on health 
outcomes, holding constant the positive associations of 
tax revenues with greater health spending.
After correcting for the association between infant 
mortality and government health spending, we evaluated 
the adjusted association of taxation with under-5 
mortality. The forest plot (ﬁ gure 3) shows the results of 
these four models. Each $100 increase per capita in 
revenues from consumption taxes, tending to reduce the 
ability of the poor to aﬀ ord essential goods, was 
associated with a signiﬁ cantly higher post-neonatal 
mortality rate by 0·17 (95% CI 0·07–0·28), infant 
mortality rate (1–5 years) by 0·18 (0·05–0·32) and 
under-5 mortality rate by 0·43 (0·14–0·72). Taxes on 
income, proﬁ ts, and capital gains were not associated 
with child survival outcomes (appendix).
Although consumption taxes are widespread, 
13 governments had exemptions for health care and staple 
foods (appendix). These exemptions should mitigate the 
adverse eﬀ ects described above. Using VAT data from 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, we found that, in the absence 
of tax exemptions for health care, consumption taxes, and 
infant mortality are even more strongly associated (0·50%, 
Public health spending* Private health spending*
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
$100 increase in tax 
revenue*
$15·8†
(10·82 to 
20·73; 2·49); 
p<0·0001
$9·86†
(3·92 to 15·8; 2·99); 
p=0·0014
$4·95†
(3·07 to 6·84; 
0·95); 
p<0·0001
–$1·82
(–4·85 to 1·20; 1·52); 
p=0·23
$100 increase in GDP* ·· $1·86†
(0·73 to 2·98; 0·57); 
p=0·0015
·· $2·12†
(1·29 to 2·96; 0·42); 
p<0·0001
Number of countries 89 89 89 89
Country-years 813 813 813 813
R² 0·57 0·60 0·20 0·37
Source: World Bank Indicators. Models 1 and 2 have public health spending as the dependent variable. Models 3 and 4 
have private health spending as the dependent variable. 95% CI and SEs are in parentheses and are adjusted for 
repeated observations. All models correct for country-speciﬁ c diﬀ erences and time trends. GDP=gross domestic 
product. *Adjusted for purchasing power parity and inﬂ ation, per capita. †p value <0·01. 
Table 1: Association of US$100 per capita increase in tax revenues and in GDP with health system 
expenditure in low-income and middle-income countries, 1995–2011
Public health spending
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
$100 increase in tax revenue from income, 
proﬁ ts, and capital gains (progressive)*
$22·1
(9·60 to 34·54; 
6·27); p=0·0007
$22·9
(12·14 to 33·66; 
5·41); p=0·0001
$16·7†
(9·16 to 24·3; 3·80); 
p<0·0001
$100 increase in tax revenue from goods 
and services (regressive)*
·· –5·46%
(–12·75 to 1·82; 
3·67); p=0·14
$–4·37
(–12·9 to 4·11; 4·27); 
p=0·31
$100 increase in tax revenue from other 
taxes*
·· ·· $–3·40
(–24·2 to 17·4; 10·4); 
p=0·75
Number of countries 88 88 86
Country-years 806 800 745
Source: World Bank Indicators and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Models 1 to 3 have 
public health spending as the dependent variable. Data are in US$ unless otherwise speciﬁ ed. 95% CIs  and SEs are in 
parentheses and are adjusted for repeated observations. All models correct for country-speciﬁ c diﬀ erences and time 
trends. *Adjusted for purchasing power parity and inﬂ ation, per capita. †p value <0·01.
Table 2: Tax regime and government spending on health in low-income and middle-income countries, 
1995–2011 
For the Price Waterhouse 
Coopers worldwide tax 
summaries see http://
taxsummaries.pwc.com/uk/
taxsummaries/wwts.nsf/ID/
PPAA-85RDKF
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0·18 to 0·83) whereas this association disappears where 
health care is exempt (0·23%, –2·59 to 3·05). A similar 
pattern was observed with staple foods.
Having examined the association between GDP and 
taxes, we examined one further source of revenue: aid 
inﬂ ows. Since ministries of ﬁ nance tend to reduce health 
expenditures from domestic sources after receiving aid, 
particularly if receiving IMF loans,17 it might be possible that 
the inverse occurs, whereby greater taxes crowd out aid. We 
added to the models a covariate for overall development 
assistance per capita from the World Bank Development 
Indicators 2013. As shown in the appendix, there was no 
observed association of development assistance with health 
spending, whether public or private, and the associations of 
tax and GDP did not change for these outcomes.
We also did a series of robustness checks, ﬁ nding 
consistent results (appendix).
Discussion
Our ﬁ ndings suggest three main conclusions. First, in 
LMICs tax revenue is positively associated with progress 
towards UHC. Although there are examples of good 
health at low cost, UHC cannot easily be achieved 
without greater investment in health. Second, the 
commonly observed association of GDP with health 
spending seems largely mediated by greater tax 
revenues, increasing public, but not necessarily private 
health spending. Third, consumption taxes, which tend 
to be regressive, were adversely associated with child 
survival whereas there was no association with child 
survival and taxes on capital gains, proﬁ ts, and incomes. 
This association was stronger in countries that taxed 
health care and staple foods.
As with any cross-national analyses, our study has 
important limitations, some reﬂ ecting (un)availability of 
data (panel 3). There is potential for ecological fallacies; 
however, all observed associations are plausible, with well 
documented mechanisms.30 We did not have longitudinal 
data for some indicators of UHC, particularly antenatal 
care access and ﬁ nancial coverage, emphasising the need 
to improve health-system surveillance in resource-
deprived settings and to develop “internationally 
comparable indicators of quality.”2 Further, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) social health 
protection indicator probably overestimates coverage by 
private insurance whereas the ILO ﬁ nancial coverage 
indicator measures total spending rather than a core set of 
eﬃ  cient services. Although we used the best available 
mortality data reporting inaccuracies could have occurred, 
which could yield conservative estimates of the link 
between taxes and health systems. Without equity-based 
metrics of UHC, the current country-level UHC measures 
might mask within-country inequalities, especially in 
large countries such as China or India.31
Figure 2: Tax revenues, GDP, and the breadth and depth of coverage in low-tax revenue countries
Source: WHO, World Bank Indicators and International Labour Organization. All models estimated using ordinary least squares. Low tax revenue countries are those 
where revenues are less than $1000 per capita. Tax revenue and GDP are adjusted for purchasing power parity and inﬂ ation, per capita. GDP=gross domestic product. 
*Proportion of pregnancies. †Proportion of the population not exposed to severe ﬁ nancial costs. For full models see the appendix. 
Antenatal coverage*
$100 increase in tax revenue
$100 increase in GDP
Skilled births*
$100 increase in tax revenue
$100 increase in GDP
Health coverage†
$100 increase in tax revenue
$100 increase in GDP
Variables
47
47
43
43
73
73
Countries
 6·74 (0·87 to 12·61)
 0·13 (–0·86 to 1·13)
 5·25 (–0·99 to 11·49)
 0·11 (–0·86 to 1·09)
 11·35 (5·51 to 17·19)
 –0·53 (–1·57 to 0·50)
Percentage point 
change, % (95% CI)
0·46
0·46
0·36
0·36
0·39
0·39
R2
–10 –5 0
Percentage point change (%)
5 10 15 20
Figure 3: After correcting for health spending, the association of alternative tax regimes with child survival, 
89 low-income and middle-income countries, 1995–2011
Source: World Bank Indicators and IHME. SEs are adjusted for repeated observations. All models correct for 
country-speciﬁ c diﬀ erences and time trends. The natural log of the dependent variable is used in these models. All 
models adjust for total public health spending and other tax revenue. *Adjusted for purchasing power parity and 
inﬂ ation, per capita. †Deaths per 1000 livebirths per year (before age of 1 month). ‡Deaths per 1000 livebirths per 
year (before the age of 1 year). §Deaths per 1000 livebirths per year (after the age of 1 year and under the age of 
5 years); ¶Deaths per 1000 livebirths (under the age of 5 years). For full models see appendix.
Neonatal mortality†
Income, profits, and capital gains
Goods and services
Postneonatal mortality‡
Income, profits, and capital gains
Goods and services
1–5 years mortality§
Income, profits, and capital gains
Goods and services
Under-5 mortality¶
Income, profits, and capital gains
Goods and services
$100 increase in tax revenue*
 –0·11 (–0·32 to 0·09)
 0·10 (0·00 to 0·21)
 –0·07 (–0·33 to 0·18)
 0·17 (0·07 to 0·28)
 0·15 (–0·10 to 0·39)
 0·18 (0·05 to 0·32)
 –0·06 (–0·65 to 0·53)
 0·43 (0·14 to 0·72)
Increase in the 
mortality rate (95% CI)
–1·0 –0·5 0
Change in the mortality rate
0·5 1·0
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Future research is also needed to assess how the 
political orientation of the government might aﬀ ect both 
progressivity of taxation and allocation to health. Our 
results suggest that taxes on income, proﬁ ts, and capital 
gains are positively associated with government health 
spending whereas consumption taxes are not. This 
ﬁ nding portrays how left-leaning governments invest 
more than right-leaning governments in social protection 
programmes, including health, through general taxation, 
and draw taxes on income, proﬁ ts, and capital gains that 
pose relatively less harm to deprived groups.32
The World Bank tax data have limitations, combining 
multiple sources into single measures. Future 
surveillance eﬀ orts must disaggregate these sources to 
enable comparison of their eﬀ ectiveness. Our analysis 
used the average level of tax revenue per person and was 
unable to account for diﬀ ering degrees of tax avoidance, 
more likely to occur among high-income groups and 
large multinational corporations.33 More work is also 
needed to understand how tax revenues can be increased 
in economies dominated by informal production and 
in settings in which costs of registering taxable activity 
are lower.11
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study has 
important implications for global health policy. First, 
development of a stable, tax-revenue base might help 
donor-dependent countries transition to independence 
from external aid ﬁ nancing. The UK government, for 
example, worked with two developing countries 
(Ethiopia and Tanzania) to reduce tax evasion, increasing 
tax revenues by 40% between 2010 and 2013.34 Such 
interventions could strengthen health systems. Before 
the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, only one in ﬁ ve 
leading mining companies had paid any corporate 
income tax.35
Well chosen consumption taxes can serve population 
health, like those on cigarettes and alcohol, and others 
can be more progressive, such as taxing luxury goods. 
Second, although increasing GDP will, if tax rates remain 
stable, increase health spending, over the past decade we 
have not seen this pattern. As global GDP rose over the 
past decade, global tax revenues, as a proportion of global 
GDP, fell from 15·7% in 2001 to 13·6% in 2010, 
corresponding to a loss of US$1·4 trillion in revenue, 
enough to ﬁ nance UHC at current estimates.12
Low-income countries have lower tax-to-GDP ratios 
than do high-income countries.11 Taking the Indian 
government as an example, in 2011 it spent $28 per 
person on health. If India increased tax revenue from 
10·4% of GDP to 14·4%, the proportion seen in 
high-income countries, it would generate additional 
revenue of $44·3 per person—ample to ﬁ nance Chatham 
House’s UHC goals and attain The Lancet’s “grand 
convergence”7 in child and maternal mortality.7,28 While 
raising already high taxes further might yield less 
revenue, the low tax rates in LMICs suggest a wide scope 
to increase them.36
In view of strong evidence that investing in health 
improves economic growth, progressive tax policies 
should enhance economic performance and reduce 
health inequalities between countries, while reducing 
poverty and promoting UHC.
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